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The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is the flagship of US commercial and development 
policy with Sub-Saharan Africa. This paper looks at the impact of the trade preferences, the central 
element of AGOA, on African countries’ exports to the US and puts them in the perspective of the 
development of the region.  The paper finds that, while stimulating export diversification in a few 
countries, AGOA has fallen short of the potential impetus that preferences could otherwise provide 
African exporters. The impact of AGOA would be enhanced if preferences were extended to all 
products. This means removing tariff barriers to a range of agricultural products and to textiles and a 
number of other manufactured goods. There also needs to be a fundamental change in approach to the 
rules of origin. Given the stage of development and economic size of Sub-Saharan Africa, non-
restrictive rules of origin are crucial. For all countries in Africa, those that have and those that have not 
benefited from preferences, there are enormous infrastructure weaknesses and often extremely poor 
policy environments that raise trade costs and push African producers further away from international 
markets. Effective trade preferences (those with non-restrictive rules of origin) can provide a limited 
window of opportunity to export while these key barriers to trade are addressed. But dealing with the 
barriers is the priority.   
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The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is the flagship of US commercial and 
development policy with Sub-Saharan Africa. First signed into law in 2000, AGOA has 
subsequently been extended and modified twice. The principal element of AGOA is an 
enhanced set of trade preferences with increased commodity coverage beyond that of the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for developing countries. This paper looks at the 
impact of these trade preferences on African countries’ exports to the US and puts them in the 
perspective of the development of the region.   
 
The paper finds that, while stimulating export diversification in a few countries, AGOA has 
fallen short of the potential impetus that preferences could otherwise provide African 
exporters. This is because of limitation in product coverage and impediments due to the rules 
of origin. More broadly, preferences should be considered as only one instrument in the 
arsenal of the international community. This is because so many of Africa’s exports already 
enter Northern countries’ markets duty free, but still face considerable constraints relating to 
quality, transport and supply chain management, together with poor domestic policy 
environments, that prevent these traditional products from realizing their development 
potential. This underscores the importance of aid for trade; development assistance that is 
targeted at helping developing countries to take advantage of trade opportunities.   
 
For some countries, AGOA has stimulated export growth through diversification, primarily 
into apparel, with positive impacts on employment and incomes in the export sector. A central 
driver of this program has been the nonrestrictive rules of origin for apparel. These are set to 
expire in September 2007, and if not renewed will likely have a devastating impact on 
exports, employment and earnings in the 6-12 countries that have benefited so far, and 
remove an avenue for diversification for other African countries.  
 
2. AGOA and Market Access 
A key element of AGOA is improved access to the US market for African exporters through: 
• Improved certainty and predictability of preferences by guaranteeing benefits until 2015 
(the GSP expires at the end of 2006) and by removing limits on those benefits that arise 
when a country’s exports of a product exceed a certain share of US imports or a particular 
monetary value (although these had already been removed for LDCs) 
• The granting of preferences on a range of products normally excluded from the GSP 
• Amendments to the rules of origin to allow for cumulation across all AGOA beneficiaries 
in meeting the standard 35 percent value-added requirement, of which 15 percentage 
points can be derived from imported US inputs 
• The granting of duty-free preferences to apparel products.  
 
Appendix 1 shows that in terms of improved market access the potential impact of AGOA 
differs between least developed countries (LDCs) and non-LDCs. For the LDCs what matters 
is whether they are able to access the preferences on apparel products since most of the other 
products liberalized under AGOA had already been liberalized under the GSP. In terms of the 
number of tariff lines liberalized, the principal impact of AGOA falls on the non-LDC Sub-
Saharan African countries.  
   3
The inclusion of apparel ensures that AGOA removes significant tariff peaks within 
manufacturing. Although a number of above average duty manufactured products are 
excluded from preferences. Thus, the average margin of preference for manufactures under 
AGOA is more than 12 percent, compared to an average tariff for manufacturing as a whole 
of 3 percent. However, more than 900 tariff lines for manufactured products such as textiles 
and leather products are not covered by AGOA. The average duty on these excluded products 
is around 9 percent. Within agriculture, preferences under AGOA are granted for products 
with lower than average duties reflecting that AGOA excludes a range of high duty products. 
The average margin of preference under AGOA is 7.7 percent whereas the average 
agricultural tariff is 12 percent and the average duty on products excluded from AGOA is 
more than 30 percent.
2 As a result, African exporters still face substantial tariff escalation and 
tariff peaks for agricultural products.  
 
How important are these remaining trade barriers? It is sometimes argued that since imports 
from Africa in many of these product categories are zero, suggesting little supply capacity, 
then the barriers cannot be important. Of course, if this is the case then there is no need to 
maintain these tariffs against Africa. In practice, the continuation of these barriers may well 
be stifling investment and preventing expansion of products in which African countries may 
have export potential. These supply potentials cannot be observed. Nevertheless, for certain 
products that are still subject to tariff restrictions under AGOA we do observe exports from 
Africa to the EU (see Appendix 2). Trade with the EU is most extensive in sugar and cotton, 
both of which are subject to very high duties in the US, although the US subsidy regime for 
cotton is also a key element restricting market access to the US and undermining export 
returns for African producers. There are also excluded products for which preferences could 
give a substantial incentive to exports from Africa. For example, peanuts from AGOA 
beneficiaries are subject to a duty of 163.8% and in addition further safeguard duties can be 
levied which are targeted against low priced imported peanuts, precisely those that can be 
exported from Africa. Finally, it is often asserted that stimulating the textile sector of African 
countries is a key objective, yet textile products from African countries are subject to duties in 
the US.
3 As we shall argue below it is a mistaken belief that investment in textile capacity can 
be encouraged by restrictive rules of origin on the content of apparel exports. 
 
3. Changes in Africa’s Exports to the US under AGOA 
Exports of AGOA countries to the US have increased substantially since 2001, but looking 
behind the numbers indicates that only a small share of the increment is directly attributable to 
AGOA. The change in total US imports under AGOA is a rather misleading indicator of the 
impact of AGOA. This is because there is a small preference
4 on imports of crude oil from 
African countries, which means that these imports are recorded under AGOA. Oil imports 
accounted for 90 percent of all imports recorded under AGOA in 2004. These oil imports 
                                                 
2 These average tariffs include conversion of specific duties to ad valorem equivalents using aggregate import 
quantities. 
3 With the narrow exception of hand loomed, handmade and folklore articles. 
4 Small relative to the value of a barrel of oil, but large in absolute terms. For example, the US imported almost 
$15 billion of crude oil from Nigeria in 2004 which would normally be subject to a duty of 10.5 per barrel. This 
translates into an ad valorem tax of about 0.3 percent. However, the value of this preference under AGOA 
amounted to over $40 million. An important question is who benefited from this preference and how much of the 
money actually went to Nigeria and then how much of this was used to support economic development.       4
have not been stimulated by AGOA and would have occurred in the absence of AGOA. US 
imports under AGOA increased nearly three-fold between 2001 and 2004, but 89 percent of 
this increase is due to imports of crude oil. The recent increase in oil prices exacerbates the 
problem, since about half of the increase in the value of oil imports reflects increased 
quantities and the other half reflects higher prices. Hence, a meaningful analysis of the impact 
of AGOA needs to be based upon non-oil imports, which is the approach we take in the rest of 
this paper.   
 
We start be comparing non-oil exports of AGOA beneficiaries
5 to the US with their exports to 
other regions, specifically the EU and Asia. Figure 1 shows that the EU is the main market for 
the exports of AGOA beneficiaries, accounting for around 60% of exports to these three 
regions. Non-oil exports from AGOA beneficiaries to all regions grew strongly over the first 5 
years of this decade. Between 1999 and 2004 export growth to the US was the strongest and 
the share of the US in AGOA beneficiaries’ exports to these three regions increased from 14.3 
to 16.6 percent
6, although exports to the US declined in 2005 reflecting falling exports of 
apparel products.  However, this export growth by AGOA beneficiaries is not broadly based. 
Some countries have seen very significant export growth while others have seen declines in 
the value of exports. For example, exports of Namibia to the US more than quadrupled 
between 1999 and 2005 while exports from Botswana have increased more than 10-fold (85% 
of the increase are due to increased diamond exports). On the other hand, exports from Ghana 
to the US fell by almost a half over the same period. Overall, 24 of the AGOA beneficiaries 
experienced a growth in non-oil exports since 1999 while exports declined for the remaining 
13 beneficiaries. 
 
Figure 1 shows total exports to the US and other regions but it does not isolate the impact of 
AGOA. Figure 2 shows the value of AGOA beneficiaries exports to the US that actually enter 
under AGOA, the value that enters under the GSP and finally the value of exports that does 
not enter under a specific program and is eligible to pay the normal (MFN) duty rate. For the 
vast majority of exports from these African countries that enter the US under no program the 
valid MFN duty is zero, reflecting exports of primary products and minerals. However, as 
noted above, there are a number of products that are excluded from AGOA preferences, 
mainly sensitive agricultural products and textiles, where exports from Africa are subject to, 
often very high, duties. Currently, the value of such exports is very low.  
 
                                                 
5 Our analysis is based on the 37 AGOA beneficiaries of 2005 that are listed in Table 1and look at the evolution 
of the exports of these countries as a group over time. Since AGOA was launched in 2001 Sierra Leone, Gambia, 
DR Congo, Angola and Burkina Faso have become beneficiaries. Burundi becomes a beneficiary in 2006. 
Countries that have been removed from the list of beneficiaries are Eritrea, Central African Republic and Cote 
d'Ivoire, while Mauritania loses eligibility in 2006. 
6 Exports to the US have increased by 82 percent compared to a 57 percent increase in exports to the EU. 
However, in absolute terms the increase in the dollar value of exports to the EU is much larger, being more than 
double that of the increase in the dollar value of exports to the US. These trends in the dollar value of exports 
reflect the appreciation of the euro against the dollar over the period since 2001.    5



























In addition, there are cases where although an export is eligible for GSP or AGOA 
preferences it does not request those preferences and enters the US paying the MFN duty. 
This may reflect lack of knowledge of those preferences, or much more likely, that the costs 
of satisfying the rules of origin exceed the value of the preference. For example, in 2004 more 
than 50 percent of Mauritius’s exports of knitted apparel that was eligible for AGOA 
preferences entered under no program, probably because complying with those rules would 
have undermined the ability to compete in the US market. In 2005, when Mauritius had access 
under the third country fabric rule, this value fell to 22 percent (we return to the issue of rules 
of origin in more detail below). 
 
Figure 2 shows that exports to the US under AGOA have grown strongly since 2000 reaching 
nearly $2.2 billion in 2004 but falling to $1.7 billion in 2005. Exports entering under the GSP 
have also increased since 2001 and their dollar value in 2005 was almost double that of 1999. 
The majority of exports from AGOA beneficiaries to the US continue to enter under no 
program, although most are subject to a zero duty. Exports entering under no program have 
also increased strongly in recent years and were 50% higher in 2005 than in 1999. Some of 
the decline in no program exports in 2001 and 2002 reflects the shift into the use of AGOA 
preferences. As we shall see later, trade under AGOA is not evenly distributed across 
countries, a small group of countries account for the vast majority of AGOA exports. Exports 
under AGOA are also highly concentrated on a particular product, apparel, to which we now 
turn. Apparel accounts for much of the increase under AGOA up to 2004 and accounts for 40 
percent of the decrease in AGOA trade in 2005.  
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4. Exports under AGOA Are Driven by Apparel 
Diversification into new export categories, reducing the dependence on exports of traditional 
primary commodities, is a major objective for many developing countries. Exports of apparel 
have provided an initial step on the route to more diversified exports for many developing 
countries. Through manufactures of apparel developing countries have been able to 
significantly increase and diversify exports with positive effects on incomes, employment, 
and poverty.
7 Apparel remains a key sector for many developing countries since they can 
exploit their comparative advantage in low labor cost operations whilst many apparel products 
remain subject to relatively high tariff barriers in the EU and the US. In addition, technology 
is relatively simple, start-up costs are comparatively small and scale economies are not 
important, all favoring production in low labor cost locations. 
 
Indeed, it is exports of apparel that have been at the forefront of the expansion of Africa’s 
non-oil exports to the US under AGOA. Exports of apparel to the US from AGOA 
beneficiaries have increased by 140 percent since 2000. Exports of apparel have grown much 
faster than exports of other non-oil products leading to a substantial diversification of overall 
exports. The share of apparel in these countries exports to the US has increased from 13 
percent to 20 percent. All of the increase in apparel exports has taken place under AGOA, 
which offers substantial preferences for African countries since tariffs on many apparel 
products exceed 15%. This expansion took place while major exporters of apparel in Asia 
                                                 
7 Kabeer and Mahmoud (2004) suggest that the production of garments for export in Bangladesh has generated 
1.6 million new jobs, most of which were captured by women. Many of these workers tend to be migrants from 
poorer areas. Kabeer and Mahmoud also find that wages for garment workers are double those of other workers 
involved in nontradable activities. There is, however, some evidence to suggest that workers in this sector are 
vulnerable to changing employment contracts and the increasing “casualization” of work (Nadvi 2004).   7
faced quantitative restrictions on their exports to the US under the Agreement of Textiles and 
Apparel (ATC). These quotas were removed (although some restrictions have been re-
imposed on China) at the end of 2004, the impact of which we briefly review later.  
 
Exports of apparel are concentrated on a small number of countries with 96 percent of US 
imports of apparel under AGOA in 2004 coming from just 7 countries and 75% from just 4 
beneficiaries (Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, and Swaziland). While apparel exports from Sub-
Saharan countries to the US have generally decreased during 2005, some new countries are 
emerging as apparel exporters. Botswana, Tanzania, Uganda
8, Mozambique, and Ethiopia 
have all substantially increased exports of apparel in 2005. A crucial feature of this expansion 
of apparel exports has been the trade supporting nature of the rules of origin that the US has 
adopted for apparel exports under AGOA. However, these rules of origin are due to be 
removed in 2007, which will severely impact apparel exports under AGOA. We therefore 
proceed to discuss in more detail the rules of origin under AGOA. 
 
5.1 The Importance of the Rules of Origin in Determining the Impact of AGOA 
As in all preferential schemes, access under AGOA is governed by rules of origin. In general, 
the way that the rules of origin are specified is a major determinant of the impact of 
preferential trade agreements. Rules of origin are necessary to ensure that only products from 
beneficiary countries are granted trade preferences by preventing trade deflection, whereby 
products from nonbeneficiary countries are transshipped through the beneficiary (with 
minimal processing) so as to avoid the payment of tariffs. Avoiding trade deflection is in the 
interest of the country that grants the preference as well as the one that receives it. However, 
rules of origin for non-reciprocal trade preferences are set by the preference-granting country 
and are often manipulated to achieve other objectives. Too often, the result is that market 
access for the beneficiaries is limited, and the objective of promoting developing-country 
exports is undermined.  
 
The issue of rules of origin arises when products produced in Africa seeking preferences in 
the US under AGOA contain imported inputs. In this case the rules of origin specify how 
much work on the product must be undertaken in the beneficiary country for it to be deemed 
as originating in that country. The higher the level of working that is required by the rules of 
origin, the more difficult they are to satisfy and the more they constrain market access 
(relative to what would be required to prevent preferences being granted to products that have 
been subject to only minimal processing). Under AGOA there are general rules of origin that 
apply to all products with the exception of apparel. Given the importance of the increase in 
trade in apparel under AGOA we continue by discussing the role that the rules of origin have 
played in stimulating apparel exports. We then proceed to discuss the general rules of origin.  
 
5.2 Rules of Origin for Apparel 
When the US grants preferences for apparel products, such as under the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative, the rules of origin for apparel require that a specific process take place such that 
                                                 
8 There is some controversy concerning the impact of the single factory in Uganda producing apparel for export 
under AGOA. See, for example, ‘Ugandan firms struggle despite US deal’, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3857573.htm.   8
articles need to be made from US fabric which in turn has to be produced from US yarn.
9 This 
basic approach to rules of origin for apparel is carried forward to AGOA such that duty-free 
preferences are granted to apparel products assembled from fabrics and yarns formed and cut 
in the United States. However, AGOA goes further and also allows access to apparel  
 
• assembled from fabrics formed in one or more of the AGOA beneficiaries from U.S. or 
regional yarns, subject to quantitative limits 
• assembled in lesser developed countries
10 from any fabric or yarn.   
 
Apparel assembled from non-U.S. fabrics is subject to quantitative restrictions. AGOA III 
defines a limit for 2003 of 4.747 percent of the total quantity of U.S. imports of apparel 
(defined in terms of square metre equivalents (SME) of imports in the preceding 12 month 
period) rising to 7 percent in 2008 and then maintained at that level until the end of AGOA in 
2015. Within this there is a sub-limit on imports under the special rule of origin which allows 
for global sourcing of fabrics – the third country fabric rule. The key feature of this rule is that 
apparel producers may use fabrics and yarn from the most efficient sources (for example, 
from China) and still qualify for AGOA preferences. For the year starting in October 2005 
this sub cap will be equal to 2.9285 percent of total U.S. apparel imports in the previous year. 
However, this limit will be reduced to 1.6071 percent for the year starting October 2006.
11 
Then this third country fabric provision will be removed entirely at the end of September 
2007. This will have a profound impact on trade under AGOA. 
 
For the year October 2004 to end of September 2005 the overall quota was 34 percent filled. 
Within this, the limit on products subject to the non-restrictive rules of origin was 64 percent 
utilized. While the quota on products assembled from regional fabric was less than 3 percent 
filled. The volume of African exports of apparel accessing the US market under the regional 
fabric requirements of AGOA has actually declined since 2001, from 28.9 million SMEs to 
27.4 million SMEs for the period October 2004 to September 2005. On the other hand, 
African exports of apparel to the US under the third country fabric provisions of AGOA have 
increased from 158.9 million SMEs in 2001 to 343.4 million SMEs in 2005. Thus, all of the 
growth in apparel exports under AGOA since 2001 has occurred due to the provision 
allowing use of third country fabrics.  
 
                                                 
9 See Brenton and Ozden (2005) for more details. 
10 Lesser developed countries are defined as countries with GNP per head of less than $1500 in 1998 plus 
Botswana and Namibia. As of today 24 countries are qualified for apparel preferences and all have been 
designated as “lesser developed countries,” with the exception of South Africa. Mauritius has recently joined the 
group of countries eligible for this third country fabric rule after an amendment to the AGOA Acceleration Act 
of 2004 and following intense efforts by its government. The amendment limits Mauritius to a cap of about 27 
million square meter equivalents (SMEs). Mattoo et al (2003) show the restrictiveness of the general rule of 
origin for apparel relative to the third country fabric provisions. 
11 The impact of the reduction in the quota for apparel exported under the third country fabric rule will depend in 
part on the level of US imports of apparel in the year to September 2006. If total exports were to remain at the 
same level as in the year to September 2005 then the quota for 2006/2007 would be just 7 percent higher than the 
actual amount of exports of apparel using third country fabric in the year to October 2005. Hence, scope for 
further growth by existing exporters and the opportunity for new exporters to enter the market would be 
removed.   9
It is interesting to compare African countries’ performance in exporting apparel under AGOA 
with changes in their exports to the EU. Access to the EU is duty and quota free under either 
the Cotonou Agreement or Everything but Arms. Figure 3 shows that exports of apparel from 
African least developed countries (LDCs) to the EU have stagnated despite preferences, while 
exports to the US under AGOA have grown very strongly. Exports of apparel from African 
LDCs to the EU and US were almost equal in 2000, but the value of exports to the US in 2004 
was almost four times greater than the value of exports to the EU.  
 
Figure 3: Non-restrictive rules of origin have strongly stimulated US imports of 
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The key factor explaining why exports to the US have grown much faster than to the EU is 
the rules of origin. EU rules stipulate production from yarn. This entails that a double 
transformation process must take place in the beneficiary with the yarn being woven into 
fabric and then the fabric cut and made-up into apparel. These rules prohibit the use of 
imported fabric, although cumulation provisions allow for the use of inputs produced in other 
ACP countries. To obtain preferences, apparel producers must use local, EU or ACP fabrics.  
They may not use fabrics from the main fabric-producing countries in Asia and still qualify 
for EU preferences—a binding restriction, since few countries in Africa have competitive 
fabric industries. The EU rules do not allow producers in African LDCs the flexibility they 
currently have under AGOA to source fabrics globally. It is worth remembering that the EU 
has granted preferences to African countries for apparel subject to these strict rules of origin 
for more than 20 years under the Lome and then Cotonou agreements. However, these strict 
rules have done little to encourage the development of an efficient fabric industry in Africa 
and are likely to have severely constrained the impact of preferences in stimulating the 
apparel industry.
12 
                                                 
12 See Brenton and Ozden (2005) for a more detailed analysis of the impact of the EBA and AGOA on apparel 
exports from African LDCs and the role of the rules of origin.    10
 
The specific justification for removing the third country fabric provision is to encourage the 
expansion of fabric production in Africa, consistent with the view that vertical integration in 
Africa is crucial to survival in a world in which competitors in Asia are no longer constrained 
by quotas. However, the basis for this view is not well-founded
13 and, as argued above, the 
shift to restrictive rules of origin will not lead to the emergence of competitive textile 
producers in Africa, and will probably undermine the prospects of the sector. Textile capacity 
will only emerge if production of apparel continues. If the removal of the third country 
provision undermines the viability of the apparel sector then there will be no demand for 
locally produced yarns and fabrics (Manchester Trade Team 2005). Very little investment in 
textile production is actually taking place in Africa resulting in widespread shortage of textile 
inputs for the apparel sector (ITC 2004). Substantial improvements in infrastructure, 
especially power and transport, together with a better climate for investment are essential 
requirements for significant investments in textile production.  
 
The key to survival and success for African firms in the competitive global apparel sector is to 
improve productivity through better training and superior management and to gradually move 
towards providing a fuller range of services to buyers encompassing product development, 
fabric sourcing, cutting, sewing packaging, quality control, trade financing and logistics 
arrangements (ITC 2004, Manchester Trade Team 2005). It is worth noting in passing that 
China imports substantial amounts of textile products to support its apparel sector. In 2004, 
the value of Chinese imports of textile fabrics amounted to over 53 percent of the amount of 
Chinese exports of fabrics. In fact, China imported considerably more textile fabrics than did 
the US in 2004. Bangladesh has been able to develop substantial exports of apparel in the 
absence of a strong vertically integrated industry.
14      
 
5.3 The General Rules of Origin  
The rules of origin that the US and EU apply to apparel products are undoubtedly restrictive 
for developing countries and their liberalization under AGOA has clearly been an important 
factor in stimulating exports from Africa. For all other products the rule of origin imposed by 
the US for preferential access under the GSP and AGOA is that at least 35 percent of the price 
paid for the product upon its export to the US must be due to activities in the country of final 
production that is seeking preferences. AGOA does allow for cumulation with other AGOA 
beneficiaries and the US. However, cumulation has not proven to be a useful mechanism for 
limiting the restrictiveness of rules of origin; see Box 1. The key question is whether this 35 
percent value-added requirement is more than is necessary to prevent trade deflection and 
would a lower requirement that is more conducive to trade achieve this task. 
 
In answering these questions it is important to consider that: (1) in the modern globalized 
world, policies that constrain access to the most appropriate and cheapest inputs seriously 
undermine competitiveness, (2) the smaller the country and the less it is developed the more 
likely it will have to access the world market to obtain the inputs it needs, (3) the comparative 
                                                 
13 See also Stevens and Kenan (2004) 
14 In fact, exports to the EU, where unlike to US, Bangladesh is eligible for preferences on apparel, could have 
been higher if the EU had not imposed the strict rule of origin requiring production from yarn. As a result of this 
rule only about half of Bangladesh’s exports of apparel to the EU actually receive preferences.   11
advantage of developing countries derives from their low labor costs, and (4) complex 
documentation requirements to prove compliance with rules of origin are costly to meet in 
many developing countries. When the rules of origin are set at too demanding a level they 
create biases against small firms and firms in low-income countries. They restrict access to 
the most efficient producers of inputs and penalize the utilization of low-cost labor in the 
production process.  
 
Box 1: Do Cumulation Provisions Lessen the Restrictiveness of the Rules of Origin and 
Encourage Regional Integration? 
Cumulation is an instrument that allows producers to import materials from a specific country or 
regional group of countries without undermining the origin of the final product. AGOA allows for 
cumulation with the US and among all Sub-Saharan African beneficiaries. This cumulation is seen as 
offsetting the restrictiveness of the rules of origin and as a means of stimulating regional economic 
integration among African countries. Restrictive rules of origin with cumulation are seen as useful in 
encouraging regional activities that could be competitive in the global market if only a certain scale of 
operation is achieved. But is this justified? Do restrictive rules of origin encourage regional activities? 
  
First, if the rules of origin are not restrictive, there is no need for cumulation. The key point is that, as 
with sourcing within a country, if efficiently produced inputs are available within the region then they 
will be used by other producers regardless of the rules of origin. However, when this is not the case, 
using rules of origin to force producers in Africa to use higher cost regional inputs undermines 
competitiveness. As long as the most efficient producer of the required inputs is excluded from the 
area of cumulation then the offset to the restrictiveness of the rules of origin will be, at best, partial 
and may well be worthless. Forcing firms to use high cost regional inputs is unlikely to be a recipe for 
successful regional integration and will, in practice, limit trade between partners.
15 In addition, even if 
policy makers could correctly identify those activities in which the region could be efficient at larger 
scale (which is most unlikely) restrictive rules of origin are not an appropriate response; better less 
distortive measures are available. Indeed, there is no strong empirical evidence to support the efficacy 
of cumulation provision under AGOA or any other program of preferences for developing countries.  
 
In general, the larger an economic entity the broader the range of economic activities and the more 
likely that an efficient input supplier can be found locally. Conversely, small economic entities have 
much greater need to access the global market for their inputs. The economic size of Sub-Saharan 
Africa is very small and so the scope of final goods producers to source inputs from within the region 
is severely limited. In addition, poor infrastructure within and especially between SSA countries, make 
transport between these countries extremely costly. It is worth remembering that the economic size 
(combined GDP) of all Sub-Saharan Africa countries taken together is considerably less than the 
economic size (gross state product) of the state of Illinois. Would it make sense for producers of final 
goods in the state of Illinois to have to use inputs produced within the state to be able to sell their 
goods duty free in other US states? 
 
A firm in a small least developed country that has to import its inputs will find it more 
difficult to satisfy a  relatively high value–added rule compared to a firm in a larger more 
advanced country that can source inputs locally. Small firms seeking to establish themselves 
in the global market will find it very difficult if they are penalized by having to use more 
expensive and less appropriate inputs. Overly restrictive rules of origin deny producers in 
developing countries freedom to choose the source of their inputs, which can mean that 
                                                 
15 See Brenton, Flatters and Kalenga (2005) for the example of SADC.    12
production capacities that could have had a substantial economic and development impact are 
denied preferential access. In some cases it may mean that investment in such capacities may 
not take place. If needed inputs are competitively produced by local firms, exporters will 
always source locally to avoid transport and other trade-related costs. However, if the right 
inputs are not available locally at a competitive price, then producers must look to overseas 
suppliers. 
 
A firm in a least developed country with lower labor costs will find it more difficult to satisfy 
a 35 percent value added rule than a firm in a more advanced country with higher labor costs 
(all other things equal). It is also important to recognize that the rules of origin define 
requirements related to the product that is exported rather than the economic activities that 
produce it. There will be cases where an activity may generate a substantial number of jobs 
but the product produced will not satisfy the rules of origin.  
 
An argument that is commonly used to support high value-added requirements is that such 
strict rules of origin are needed so as to stimulate the emergence of integrated production 
structures to maximize the impact on employment and to ensure that it is not just low value-
added activities that are undertaken in the developing countries. However, there is no 
evidence from the past 20 and more years that strict rules of origin in preferential trade 
arrangements have done anything to stimulate the development of integrated production 
structures or raise the amount of value-added that is undertaken in developing countries. In 
today’s globalised world, strict rules of origin constrain firms in developing countries in 
integrating into global and regional production networks and in effect act to dampen the 
location of any value-added activities.  
 
In the case of AGOA it is difficult to directly assess how restrictive the 35% value-added 
requirement is. However, it is clear that trade preferences have had little impact outside of 
apparel. But margins of preference are typically much lower for other products, such that the 
costs of satisfying and proving conformity with the origin requirements may easily exceed the 
benefits from requesting preferential access.
16 Following a careful examination of trade 
preferences for Africa, Stevens and Kenan (2004) conclude that it is very difficult to set the 
rules of origin ‘just right’, but to increase the opportunities for beneficiaries, preference givers 
“should always err on the side of cautious liberality”. The Blair report has recently proposed 
that an appropriate rule of origin for preferences granted to Sub-Saharan firms is a value-
added requirement of 10 percent. This would allow African exporters the needed flexibility to 
source inputs and to exploit their comparative advantage in labor-intensive products while 
preventing mere repackaging and other minimal operations. If value-added of 10% entails that 
useful economic activity takes place in the beneficiary then the rules of origin should not 
require higher amounts. Also a 10% value-added requirement common across all products is 
more transparent, simpler for firms to satisfy, and easier to administer by customs and other 
agencies than a higher value added requirement with cumulation. 
 
However, the use of a value-added rule can cause particular problems for firms in developing 
countries, particularly in the least developed. Proving compliance can be costly for firms that 
                                                 
16 There are a number of high duty products, such as footwear, with labor intensive final stages of production 
that have seen little export response under AGOA.   13
will require sophisticated accounting systems and the ability to resolve often-complex 
accounting questions. In addition, under the value added method origin is sensitive to changes 
in the factors determining production cost differentials across countries such as exchange 
rates, wages and commodity prices.  For example, operations that confer origin in one 
location may not do so in another because of differences in wage costs.  An operation that 
confers origin today may not do so tomorrow if exchange rates change. For these reasons it is 
useful to allow firms in developing countries the option of satisfying either a value-added rule 
(of 10%) or the alternative of satisfying a change of tariff sub-heading requirement (the 
exported product cannot be the “same”, in terms of the tariff classification, as the imported 
inputs).
17 The latter is not subject to uncertainty regarding changes in exchange rates and 
prices and is relatively straightforward to implement.  In terms of documentary requirements 
it requires that traders keep records that show the tariff classification of the final product and 
all the imported inputs. 
 
6. The Value of US Trade Preferences 
We now proceed to discuss the value of AGOA (and GSP) preferences that are actually 
requested by African exporters.
18 We assume that all of the rents from preferences go to 
developing country exporters. However, if there is little effective competition among 
importers of the product then the exporters may be unable to acquire much of the price 
premium. Ozden and Olarreaga (2005) find evidence that only one-third of the available rents 
for African exports of apparel to the US under AGOA actually accrue to the exporters. Hence, 
our calculations will provide an upper bound on the value of AGOA preferences to African 
countries.  
 
In Table 1 countries are ordered according to the magnitude of the value of preferences, 
expressed as a share of the value of the country’s total exports to the US. The scope for 
preferences to play a significant role given the existing structure of trade is determined by the 
extent to which the beneficiary exports to the US products eligible for preferences. This is 
captured in the second column of the table, which shows the proportion of exports to the US 
in products subject to a zero duty. For example, 99 percent of DR Congo’s non-oil exports to 
the US in 2005 were of products with a zero tariff (mainly diamonds) for which no preference 
can be granted. Hence, GSP and AGOA preferences can have virtually no immediate impact 
on DR Congo. For AGOA preferences to be a tool for non-oil export expansion for DR Congo 
they will have to be a vehicle that stimulates diversification into a broader range of products. 
On the other hand, only 3 percent of Lesotho’s exports to the US are products that are subject 




                                                 
17 In a small number of cases a change of tariff sub-heading (the 6 digit level of the Harmonized System) will not 
be sufficient to ensure that substantial economic activity has taken place in the beneficiary. For these products 
another alternative for satisfying origin can be offered.  
18 The value of preferences is calculated as the sum across exported products of the amount of exports requesting 
preferences under the GSP or AGOA multiplied by the tariff rate (including specific duties) for that product. 
This is a measure of the tariff duties that would have been paid if AGOA and GSP preferences were not 
available. This is a measure of the value of preferences after the supply response to those preferences has taken 
place.   14



































Swaziland 183,231  1.6%  88.9% 34,893 19.0% 19.0% 99.0%
Cape Verde  2,622  10.1%  89.9% 491 18.7% 18.7% 92.2%
Lesotho 401,785  2.7%  97.3% 72,350 18.0% 18.0% 99.4%
Madagascar 323,787 13.3% 86.7% 48,965 15.1% 15.1% 98.4%
Kenya 347,062  16.4%  83.4% 49,387 14.2% 14.1% 98.3%
Malawi 112,839  7.2%  92.8% 15,687 13.9% 4.4% 99.2%
Mauritius 218,619  19.3%  80.6% 27,034 12.4% 12.3% 87.6%
Mozambique 6,362  36.6%  63.4% 670 10.5% 7.7% 99.5%
Namibia 123,869  56.7%  43.3% 8,976 7.2% 7.2% 99.8%
Botswana 177,558  82.6%  17.4% 6,582 3.7% 3.7% 99.7%
Uganda 25,773  80.7%  19.3% 898 3.5% 3.4% 99.8%
Tanzania 32,879  83.1%  14.1% 584 1.8% 1.5% 88.6%
Ethiopia 61,705  91.3%  8.7% 945 1.5% 1.4% 98.5%
Ghana 100,353  84.4%  15.4% 1,209 1.2% 0.7% 95.8%
Niger 1,192  61.8%  30.5% 14 1.1% 0.0% 64.9%
South Africa  5,808,641  71.7% 27.4% 52,203 0.9%  0.2% 85.8%
Mali 3,155  82.8%  15.6% 11 0.4%  0.0% 58.7%
Burkina Faso  2,016  91.3%  7.9% 4 0.2%  0.0% 73.8%
Senegal 3,315  77.3%  22.5% 8 0.2%  0.0% 31.2%
Gambia 424  92.2%  2.1% 0 0.1%  0.0% 100.0%
Mauritania 823  75.7%  9.4% 1 0.1%  0.0% 34.5%
Rwanda 6,280  97.4%  2.6% 7 0.1%  0.0% 55.7%
Sierra Leone  9,424  89.8%  10.1% 14 0.1%  0.0% 23.7%
Angola 67,170  99.9%  0.1% 1 0.0%  0.0% 38.1%
Benin 514  97.9%  2.1% 0 0.0%  0.0% 22.0%
Cameroon 51,405  94.0%  5.6% 19 0.0% 0.0% 13.4%
Chad 15,079  99.8%  0.2% 0 0.0%  0.0% 0.0%
Congo 13,499  99.4%  0.6% 2 0.0%  0.0% 71.8%
DR Congo  128,181  99.1%  0.9% 26 0.0% 0.0% 90.1%
Djibouti 1,093  99.1%  0.0% 0 0.0%  0.0%  
Gabon 55,343  98.5%  1.5% 16 0.0% 0.0% 40.8%
Guinea 74,485  99.6%  0.3% 5 0.0%  0.0% 49.6%
Guinea Bissau  120  94.2%  5.8% 0 0.0%  0.0% 0.0%
Nigeria 104,859  97.6%  1.0% 25 0.0% 0.0% 41.0%
Sao Tome  213  52.1%  47.4% 0 0.0%  0.0% 0.0%
Seychelles 5,374  97.9%  1.7% 0 0.0%  0.0% 0.0%
Zambia 31,662  99.4%  0.5% 4 0.0%  0.0% 75.8%
TOTAL 8,502,711  62.3%  36.8% 321,030 3.8%  3.1% 95.4%
 
The third column in Table 1 shows the value of exports to the US that was eligible for 
preferences in the US in 2005. This is not necessarily the exact converse of the share of 
exports in zero duty products because of products such as sensitive agricultural products and   15
textiles that are excluded from AGOA and GSP preferences. These products represent 
approximately 0.9 percent of total non-oil exports to the US. The next column in Table 1 
shows the calculated value of preferences for each beneficiary. This ranges from 0 to 19 
percent of the value of exports to the US and is closely linked to the share of exports in 
dutiable products. 
 
Table 2 summarizes this information and shows that for the majority of beneficiaries the value 
of preferences is very small or negligible. For 26 of the 37 beneficiaries the value of 
preferences is less than 2 percent of the value of exports to the US in 2005. For only 8 
countries does the value of preferences exceed 10 percent of the value of exports to the US.  
 
Table 2: Value of US Preferences in 2005 (% of the value exports) 
0-2%  2-5%  5-10 %  >10 % 
Angola, Burkina Faso, Benin, 
Cameroon, Djibouti, Chad, 
Congo, DR Congo, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao 
Tome, Senegal, Seychelles, 
Sierra Leone, South Africa, 











Table 1 also provides information on the contribution of apparel exports to the value of 
preferences. For most countries US preferences under AGOA are driven by apparel. This is 
emphasized in Figure 4 which plots the share of apparel in exports that are eligible for 
preferences against the value of preferences. The majority of beneficiaries are represented in 
the dark over-written area in the bottom left hand corner of the figure where the contribution 
of apparel and the value of preferences are both very close to zero. Where the value of 
preferences is significant it is typically almost entirely due to apparel. The key exception is 
Malawi, where preferences for tobacco are important, although the contribution of apparel to 
the value of preferences is nearly 30 percent. Hence, factors that affect exports of apparel will 
have a very large influence on the future impact of AGOA, an issue to which we now turn. 
 
7. The Prospects for Apparel Exports from Africa 
Two key policy changes are currently of relevance: the removal of quotas on imports from 
China and other Asian producers at the end of 2004 and the diminution in 2006 and then 
removal of the third country fabric provision of AGOA in September 2007. We discussed 
above how the removal of the third country fabric provision will undermine apparel exports. 
But will this matter if African countries are unable to compete with China in the more 
competitive post-quota climate? Certainly, by placing more onerous requirements on African 
apparel producers to use US or regional fabrics when these are not appropriate or least cost 
will hamper their ability to compete with China in the US market. 
   16
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Whilst it is difficult to make definite conclusions, analysis of the initial impact of the removal 
of quotas suggests that some of the doom and gloom scenarios of widespread destruction of 
apparel jobs in Africa are inappropriate. Although some of the key beneficiaries of apparel 
preferences (Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Swaziland) have seen substantial declines in 
exports in 2005, other countries have managed to sustain exports (Kenya) and others have 
been able to substantially increase their exports (Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana) (see 
Figure 5). An important feature of performance in the US market in the immediate aftermath 
of the removal of quotas is that those countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with an integrated 
textile and apparel sector (South Africa and to an extent Mauritius) have not fared better than 
countries exporting under the third country fabric rule. There are of course other factors, such 
as the increase in the value of the rand (which also explains some of the decline of Lesotho), 
which have contributed to these outcomes. Nevertheless, neither South Africa nor Mauritius 
believes that its prospects in the post quota world are enhanced by the backward linkages to 
textiles (Stevens and Kenan (2004)).  
   17
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Lesotho is a country where exports of apparel to the US expanded substantially after 2000, 
rising from $140 million to $456 million. Reports suggest that in 2004 the sector employed as 
many as 50000 workers. In the first 11 months of 2005, exports to the US where 15 percent 
lower than in the corresponding period in 2004. Nevertheless, exports in 2005 exceed those of 
2000 by a factor of 2.5 and by over $200 million. Initial reports in the press early in 2005 
suggested that at least 10 factories had shut down and at least 10000 workers (around one-
fifth of the industry workforce) had lost their jobs. Some commentators suggest that a portion 
of the job losses reflects substantial improvements in labor productivity. Others report that 
during the course of this year some factories have been re- or newly opened and that 
employment has recovered to 45000. There are, as yet, no official data or information on 
actual job losses in the apparel sector in Lesotho this year. The picture is also clouded by the 
fact that very similar products have exhibited quite different export performance. Exports to 
the US of women’s and girls’ cotton trousers have declined substantially but exports of men’s 
and boys’ cotton trousers have increased significantly.   
 
The traded goods sector in Lesotho faces a plethora of challenges in addition to that posed by 
the removal of quotas on textiles and apparel. Bogetic (2006) finds that infrastructure service 
delivery in electricity, telephony, and roads is poor in Lesotho and even well below the 
average for countries of similar income. Removing these infrastructure shortfalls is 
fundamental to achieving cost competitiveness and realizing the growth prospects of a range 
of economic sectors (such as tourism) that depend critically on a stable and competitive 
supply of basic infrastructure service. These infrastructure limitations are a key constraint on 
regional integration, something that cannot be overcome by restrictive rules of origin that seek 
to encourage regional sourcing of inputs. In addition, there is substantial scope for 
improvements in the business climate, for example, with regard to the costs of starting a   18
business, enforcement of contracts and reducing the number of days needed for imported 
goods to clear customs.
19  
 
The situation in Kenya, where exports to the US have been sustained, highlights the 
challenges and opportunities (see Ozden (2005) for more details). Labor costs in Kenya are 
relatively low compared to key competitors. Information on labor cost per shirt produced 
suggests that costs in Kenya ($0.18) are below those of China ($0.29) and comparable with 
those of India ($0.17).  Accompanying the rapid increase in exports to the US has been entry 
into new product categories. More importantly these categories tend to be of higher price and 
quality. In addition, for a number of products, movements in relative prices suggest that 
Kenyan exporters have managed to improve the quality of their products, which augers well 
for their ability to withstand more intense competition. 
 
Kenyan exports are currently totally concentrated on the US market. Although the nature of 
the EU market is less harmonized in terms of tastes than that of the US, there are still 
substantial opportunities in the EU market. The value of exports to the US is a multiple of 34 
times greater than exports to the EU. At present, Kenya can export duty free to the EU (a 
margin of preference lower than the US, but still significant at around 12 percent) but faces 
the more restrictive rules of origin requiring production from yarn.  If the EU were to adopt 
less restrictive rules of origin this may help to stimulate Kenyan’s apparel exports. If the US 
were to make permanent the non-restrictive third country fabric requirement or adopt a 
general 10% value-added requirement for AGOA this would increase the pressure on the EU 
to adopt such development friendly rules of origin.  
 
On the other hand, the World Bank’s Investment Climate Assessment for Kenya highlights 
how competitiveness is undermined by high indirect costs, with the main barriers being 
corruption, crime and infrastructure. The key infrastructure barriers are poor transport, the 
high cost and unreliability of power services and costly and poor quality fixed-line telephone 
services. These costs undermine the advantages that Kenya possesses in terms of low cost, 
relatively well-educated labor, they depress productivity and constrain investment. Eiffert et 
al (2005) conclude that for Kenya “a long history of entrepreneurship is reflected in strong 
potential factory-floor productivity, but high costs and losses impede competitiveness”. The 
key implication of the poor business environment is lower returns to labor in production 
which depresses labor demand and real wages. Thus, Kenya possesses advantages that would 
support a trade oriented strategy based on competitiveness in global markets but these 
advantages are undermined by a range of cost raising factors.  
 
8. The Role of Preferences in Stimulating African Exports  
While exports to the US of most of the countries which receive significant preferences 
(Malawi and Mauritius are the exceptions) have grown strongly since 2000 a number of 
countries that do not receive significant preferences have also grown strongly. For example, 
AGOA preferences are of little importance to Cameroon but exports to the US have almost 
doubled since 2000. Hence, there is no correlation between the magnitude of benefits from 
AGOA preferences and recent growth of exports to the US. Thus, while AGOA preferences 
have played a role in stimulating exports from some African countries, they are just one factor 
                                                 
19 See www.doingbusiness.org   19
among many affecting exports and competitiveness. This section discusses that the priority for 
all African countries lies in reducing underlying constraints to trade in the form of inadequate 
infrastructure for trade and weak policy environments.   
 
It has become increasingly recognized that developing countries and especially least 
developed countries, face much higher trade-related costs than other countries in getting their 
products onto international markets. Sometimes these reflect institutional problems within the 
countries themselves, such as inefficient and corrupt customs, which require a domestic 
policy response. However, they also reflect the severely weak infrastructure of many 
countries that is crucial to support trade activities (in particular transport, telecommunications, 
energy) and the lack of access of firms in these countries to standard trade facilitating 
measures such as insurance and trade finance. Many developing countries also possess little 
capacity within government and the private sector to identify key trade barriers, to define a 
broadly supported trade strategy and to motivate the cross government action that is needed to 
alleviate such barriers. All developing countries in Africa face enormous problems in 
providing necessary infrastructure and a supportive policy environment for trade.   
 
The argument for trade preferences is that they can provide a temporary mechanism whereby 
the margin of preferences allows firms in developing countries to offset these higher costs and 
establish an export presence and ultimately global competitiveness in industries and activities 
in which the country has a comparative advantage. It is important that the window is 
temporary so that inefficient, high-cost industries with entrenched lobbies do not constrain 
flexibility and adjustment. Multilateral trade liberalization contributes by ensuring that 
preferences have a short “half-life”  and in limiting the long-term trade diverting impact of 
preferences on other countries (which typically will be other developing countries). However, 
it is crucial that the key factors that raise the costs of trading in developing countries are 
addressed otherwise sustainable and competitive activities will not be created. This applies to 
countries that benefit from preferences as well as those that do not.  
 
Our analysis of the impact of AGOA shows that the impact of US trade preferences has been 
highly concentrated on the apparel sector, where the margin of preference remains large. For a 
large number of African countries trade preferences will not provide a mechanism for 
increased exports and growth in the short run.
20 For these countries, reinforcing traditional 
exports and facilitating export diversification by addressing policy and infrastructure 
constraints to trade will be necessary to stimulate exports, growth and poverty reduction. It is 
in this context that “aid for trade” can play an important role in supporting domestic reforms 
that improve policy environments and in filling infrastructure gaps that impinge on the 
capacity to trade.  
 
In companion work we look in more detail at the magnitude and outcomes of trade assistance 
programs for African countries (Brenton and Hoppe 2006). Here we proceed to highlight the 
key issues and potential impacts with a specific example, that of Rwanda, presented in Box 2. 
This shows how carefully designed assistance programs can support greater exports, higher 
incomes and poverty reduction in the least developed countries. A key feature of such 
                                                 
20 Similar analysis for EU trade preferences comes to similar conclusions. Substantial preferences are only 
available to a small number of African countries. See Brenton and Ikezuki (2005).    20
assistance is that it has supported the expansion of exports to all key markets. A trade 
preferences scheme can at best stimulate exports to a particular market. In fact in the case of 
Rwanda, preferences have played no role in the recent expansion of exports. Coffee, which 
has been the source of export growth, is subject to zero tariffs in both the US and the EU.
21  
 
It is worth putting the importance of coffee to Rwanda in context. Agriculture is the dominant 
activity for the 90 percent of the population living in rural areas. The industrial sector is very 
small. According to the 2002/3 survey of enterprises, total employment in the industrial sector 
was just 36,000, most of it in the public sector enterprises. This is a very small industrial base 
in relation to the almost half a million farmers who grow, at least some, coffee. So, in the 
short-run policies that enhance returns to coffee and other traditional exports and support 
farmers to shift out of subsistence activities into commercial production (those employed in 
producing traditional commercial crops for export tend to be less poor than farmers involved 
in non-market production) will have the greatest impact on poverty. Access to transport, for 
example, is a key factor affecting the propensity to shift into commercial production. 
Nevertheless, for sustainable long-term growth, it is necessary to complement such a strategy 
by pursuing diversification. Rwanda is typical of many poor countries in Africa, where 
poverty reduction in the short-term is inextricably linked with the export of traditional 
agricultural products.  
 
Box 2: Rwandan Coffee – challenges, opportunities and the role of aid for trade 
Coffee is a key export crop in Rwanda. In 2003, an aggressive strategy was developed to both increase 
total exports of coffee and move the industry into the high quality, specialty end of the market. This 
was estimated to require an investment of $69m: $24.75m from donors/NGOs, $23m from the private 
sector, and $21.25m from the Rwandan government. Two long-term, donor-funded projects have been 
assisting producers in developing buyer-seller relationships and assisting growers in upgrading quality. 
Aid projects have also helped farmers to form cooperatives to meet the requirements of “fair trade” 
coffee or to experiment with organic or shade grown coffees (all of which earn a substantial premium 
over regular coffee). This together with increased access to washing stations has also led to increases 
in farmer income by up to 55 percent. Washing and grading the coffee cherries has enabled those of 
higher quality to earn higher prices, giving farmers an incentive to increase quality. Regulatory reform 
has also allowed individual Rwandan cooperatives or private owners to negotiate directly with 
specialty roasters in the US and Europe, enabling them to sell to specialty markets at more than twice 
the market rate.  
 
The quality and the image of Rwandan coffee have improved markedly. Rwandan exports to the US in 
2005 were 140% higher than in 2003. This reflects a substantial increase in exports of coffee, 
Rwanda’s primary export. This increase in the value of exports was driven by a 37% increase in 
quantity and a 115 percent increase in the average price for Rwandan coffee exported to the US since 
2003. Rwandan exports of coffee to the EU (the principal market with exports in 2004 being around 5 
times larger than to the US - 18.2 million euro versus $4.5 million) were 50 percent higher in 2005 
                                                 
21 It is worth noting here that coffee is subject to duties, sometimes high, in other developing countries. For 
example, coffee faces a duty of 100 percent in India, 40 percent in Thailand and over 14 percent in China. The 
current multilateral trade negotiations are the mechanism by which Rwanda can improve access to these markets 
and increase opportunities for Rwandan exporters. In addition, for traditional commodities, such as coffee, even 
if the reduction in tariffs in Asia does not lead to new exports there could be a positive impact on Rwanda 
through the impact on world prices. Reductions in tariffs in India and China that raise the demand for imports 
could lead to higher world prices for coffee.   21
than in 2004. This increase reflects a 25% increase in the quantity of coffee exports and a 40% 
increase in the average price of Rwandan coffee exported to the EU.  
 
However, the industry still faces a number of challenges, for which further aid for trade will be 
needed, including: access to finance  (donors are already providing some support and funding to 
streamline rural finance among producers’ organizations); access to low-cost transport (the cost of 
transporting coffee from the farm gate to the port is 80% of the amount received by the coffee farmer 
and major upgrading of transport infrastructure is needed); access to training (around half a million 
Rwandan farmers need extensive training in all aspects of coffee production, but there are few 
agronomists); and developing associations and cooperatives  (technical assistance is needed to 
strengthen coffee farmer cooperatives and to form an overall industry association, along with reform 
of unclear government regulations). Diop et al (2005) demonstrate how dealing with these constraints 
could have a profound impact on rural incomes and poverty in Rwanda. 
 
Source: World Bank-IF, 2005 Rwanda: Diagnostic Trade Integration Study, Washington: World Bank. 
 
9. Conclusions 
This paper concludes that, while AGOA has played an important role in stimulating apparel 
activities in a small group of countries, its broader impact on the exports of Sub-Saharan 
African countries would be enhanced if 
 
• Preferences were extended to all products. This means removing tariff barriers to a range 
of agricultural products and to textiles and a number of other manufactured products. 
 
• There is a fundamental change in approach to the rules of origin. Given the stage of 
development and economic size of Sub-Saharan Africa, non-restrictive rules of origin are 
crucial. An appropriate rule is an across the board (including apparel) requirement that 10 
percent of the value of the product be added in the beneficiary, supported by the option of 
being able to satisfy a change of tariff sub-heading requirement. This will allow 
flexibility in sourcing inputs and the basis for long-term competitiveness. It will further 
promote exports to the US and is more likely to support regional integration than the use 
of more restrictive rules which act to dampen the activities of final goods producers. 
There is an immediate need to review the provisions concerning the rules of origin for 
apparel. The diminution in October 2006 and then removal in 2007 of the third country 
fabric provisions will seriously undermine the apparel sectors in a number of African 
beneficiaries and remove the opportunity for other countries to diversify their exports.  
 
It is important that AGOA trade preferences be put into an appropriate development 
framework. For all countries in Africa, those that have and those that have not benefited from 
preferences, there are enormous infrastructure weaknesses and often extremely adverse policy 
environments that raise trade costs and push African producers further away from 
international markets. Effective trade preferences (those with non-restrictive rules of origin) 
can provide a limited window of opportunity to export while these key barriers to trade are 
addressed. But dealing with the barriers is the priority.   
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Appendix 1: The Impact of AGOA on Market Access
22 
This appendix summarises the impact of AGOA in terms of the number of tariff lines that it 
liberalises, the average duties that would normally be paid on products covered by AGOA and 
the average duties on products that remain excluded from AGOA preferences. AGOA follows 
on from an existing scheme of preferences for developing countries under the GSP that was 
enhanced for the LDCs in 1997. Hence, we seek to highlight the additional liberalisation 
under AGOA. The analysis shows that for LDCs the impact of AGOA is concentrated on 
apparel products. It is the non-LDCs that receive the greatest additional impact in terms of 
access to the US market.  
 
Agriculture 
Table A1 shows that for the LDCs, AGOA liberalizes only an additional 26 agricultural tariff 
lines, equivalent in number to less than 2 percent of the total number of agricultural lines and 
just under 12 percent of the remaining dutiable lines. In the main the products liberalized 
under AGOA are those that have already been liberalized for LDCs under the provisions of 
the GSP.  For non-LDCs, AGOA adds 541 products to the 519 products already eligible for 
duty-free preferences for developing countries under the GSP. Hence, the potential impact on 
the non-LDCs is much greater. 
 
Table A1 also shows that there are over 200 agricultural tariff lines with no preference under 
AGOA, amounting to 17 percent of the total number of dutiable agricultural tariff lines in the 
US schedule. Of these lines more than 150 relate to the over quota rates for products subject 
to tariff rate quotas. Often these quotas are very small and many are allocated on a global 
basis. Hence, once total US imports exceed these quantitative limits exports from AGOA 
countries are subject to the normal MFN duty, which is often very high, together with any 
additional safeguard duties.  
 
The numbers in brackets show the number of product lines relating to in-quota duty rates for products subject to 
TRQs. 
                                                 
22 This appendix draws heavily on Brenton and Ikezuki (2003) 
Table A1: Liberalization of Agricultural Products under AGOA  – The Number of Tariff Lines Liberalized  
   Non-LDCs LDCs 
Total Tariff Lines  1723 1723 
Total GSP   519   1038 
     GSP   519 (38)   547 (158)  
     GSP LDC   … 491 
GSP LDC but  not  AGOA  … 4 
AGOA  541 (120)  26 
Duty-Free Lines  440 440 
Lines Excluded from AGOA   223 219 
Main sectors containing products 
excluded from preferences  
Meat, Dairy Products, Sugar, Chocolate, Prepared Food Products, Tobacco, 
Groundnuts    25
For specific tariffs trade data from 2002 are used to derive ad valorem equivalents.  When there are zero duties 
for the GSP group of countries we use data for total imports to calculate the ad valorem equivalent.   
Data source: USITC dataweb 
 
Table A2 provides a simple look at the average MFN duties that apply to agricultural 
products. The numbers presented are simple unweighted averages of duties applied in 2003. 
This provides a crude view of the margins of preference available in the US. The table shows 
that AGOA covers products with higher duties than those covered by the GSP. For example, 
the average duty on agricultural products covered by the GSP for non-LDCs is 3.5 percent. 
The average duty on the additional products for which preferences are available for LDCs 
under the GSP is 6.8 percent
23, which is similar to the average duty on products liberalized 
under AGOA. These margins of preference can be compared with the overall average duty for 
agricultural products of around 12 percent.  
 
Table A2 also shows that the products excluded from preferences are high-duty products. For 
agriculture the average duty on excluded products is over 30 percent, these include the out of 
quota duty rates for products affected by tariff rate quotas. This, at least in part, might explain 
why there may be so few exports of these products from Sub-Saharan African countries to the 
US. So, AGOA excludes many sensitive agricultural products and offers preferences on 
relatively low duty products and therefore does little to reduce the tariff escalation and tariff 
peaks facing African exporters.  
 
Manufacturing 
AGOA liberalizes 1,249 manufacturing tariff lines for non-LDCs on top of the 3,116 lines 
given duty free preferences under the GSP (Table A3). These additional preferences amount 
to 14 percent of the total number of manufacturing lines. Again, the impact for LDCs is more 
limited due to the prior liberalization of many lines under the GSP. AGOA liberalises an 
additional 199 lines compared to the 4,223 lines already liberalized under the GSP. The third 
and fourth columns of the table show the importance of the liberalization of apparel products 
under AGOA which adds an additional 557 tariff lines. This creates a significant difference in 
the benefits available to Sub-Saharan African LDCs under AGOA. 
 
   
                                                 
23 We only include the in quota duty rates for the TRQ products in the calculation of the average MFN duty on 
AGOA products. We then put the out of quota rates in the calculation of the average duties on lines not covered 
by AGOA 
Table A2: Unweighted Average MFN Tariffs for Agriculture Tariff Lines covered by AGOA and 
GSP, and for those excluded from Preferences in 2003 
  Non-LDCs LDCs 
Total GSP  3.5% 5.2% 
     GSP   3.5% 3.5% 
     GSP LDC   … 6.8% 
Total AGOA  6.7% 7.7% 
    
Dutiable Lines – Products excluded from AGOA   30.7% 31.0%   26
 
For manufactures, about 16 percent of the dutiable lines are excluded from preferences for the 
countries that receive apparel benefits, while for those countries that have not been granted 
the apparel benefits duties must be paid on 25 percent of the dutiable lines in the US tariff 
schedule. The key products excluded from tariff preferences are textile products,
24 certain 
glass products and certain headwear. The average duty on textiles is over 8 percent and the 
duty on certain textile products reaches almost 30 percent. 
Source: USITC Database 
 
Table A4 shows that the average duty on manufactured products covered by the GSP is 3.8 
percent. Products covered by the basic AGOA provisions are subject to an average duty of 6.1 
percent and the apparel products on average pay a duty of more than 12 percent. The average 
tariff for manufactured products imported into the US is 3 percent. Hence, for manufactures 
AGOA includes products that have high duties relative to the overall average tariff for 
manufactures and so reduces the number of tariff peaks facing African exporters to the US. 
Nevertheless, the average duty on products not eligible for preferences is high relative to the 
overall average duty and high relative to the products covered by the GSP suggesting that a 
number of relatively high duty products remain excluded. 
 
Thus regarding the impact of AGOA 
 
• For the LDCs what matters is whether they are able to access the preferences on apparel 
products since most of the other products liberalized under AGOA had already been 
liberalized under the GSP. In terms of the number of tariff lines liberalized, the principal 
impact of AGOA falls on the non-LDC Sub-Saharan African countries. 
 
• The inclusion of apparel ensures that AGOA removes significant tariff peaks within 
manufacturing. However, preferences for agricultural products remove lower than 
                                                 
24 AGOA does provide preferences for specific textile items which are hand loomed, handmade or a folklore 
article of a beneficiary country, but in practice this has had no impact on trade. No imports into the US have been 
recorded of such products. A number of countries have been approved to export such products but the impact on 
trade will be minor. 
Table A3: Liberalization of Manufacturing Products under AGOA  – The Number of Tariff Lines Liberalized  
  Without apparel benefits  With apparel benefits 
   Non-LDC  LDC  Non-LDC  LDC 
Total Lines  8660 8660  8660  8660 
Total GSP   3116 4223  3116  4223 
     GSP   3116 3116  3116  3116 
     GSP LDC   … 1107  …  1107 
GSP LDC but  not  AGOA  … 57  …  57 
AGOA  1249 199  1806  756 
     Apparel (HS61, 62)
  … …  557  557 
Duty-Free   2773 2773  2773  2775 
Lines Excluded from AGOA   1522 1465  965  911 
Main sectors containing products 
excluded from Preferences   Leather products, Textile and textile articles, Headgear, Glass and glassware    27
average duties reflecting that AGOA excludes a range of high duty products. As a result 
tariff escalation and tariff peaks remain for agricultural products.  
 
Source: USITC Database 
 
Table A4: Unweighted Average MFN Tariffs for Manufactured Products covered by AGOA and GSP, 
and for those excluded from Preferences in 2003 
  Without apparel benefits  With apparel benefits 
 Non-LDCs  LDCs  Non-LDCs  LDCs 
Total GSP   3.8% 4.0%  3.8%  4.0% 
     GSP   3.8% 3.8%  3.8%  3.8% 
     GSP LDC   … 4.8%  …  4.8% 
Total AGOA  6.1% 12.7%  7.7%  12.3% 
     AGOA (excluding GSP)  6.1% 12.7%  6.1%  12.7% 
     AGOA apparel
  … …  12.1%  12.1% 
Dutiable Lines – Products excluded 
from AGOA  
9.9% 10.2%  8.7%  9.1%   28
Appendix 2 
 
Examples of Products Excluded from AGOA Preferences 
     
Imports from SSA in 2004 ($000) 
  
Product  Duty in US  EU Imports  US Imports 
           
Fresh or chilled meat of bovine 
Animals (boneless)  26.40%  78718  0 
       
Frozen meat of bovine animals  26.40%  17891  0 
       
Peanuts (in shell)   163.80%  1429  0 
       
Peanuts (shelled)  131.80%  16852  0 
       
Raw Sugar  33.87 c/kg  628432  39306 
       
Chocolate (in blocks) 
37.2 c/kg 
+8.5% 18169  2 
       
Peanut Butter  131.80%  1283  0 
       
Cotton 31.4  c/kg  232940  73 
       
Printed bed linen of man-made 
Fibers 4.5-14.9%  2965  5 
       
Footwear uppers of cotton  11.20%  4690  101 
 